Saturday, July 16, 2011

Distinguishing Between Tax Projects

As a Libertarian, I believe in small government and limited regulation. I believe that taxation is acceptable for wars and criminal justice. I oppose taxation for social medical care, medical care given to all in need, paid for by taxpayers. Of course, some try to justify taxation for wars, criminal justice, and social medical care on the basis that these protect citizens. In order to have a principled reason to reject taxation for social medical care, we cannot accept a justification merely on the ground that it protects citizens from harm.

The answer is that wars and criminal justice systems are necessary for the existence of democratic governments to continue. A crucial distinction between medical care and wars is that social medical care’s enemy will not overpower a country and take control of the government or damage the country’s foundation to any substantial degree. Just wars are at least often characterized by action against a country which intends harm or is harming the first country. Just wars defend at least one country against at least one other. War is justified in relation to its necessity to defend the country; without such a war, the democratic government would be in danger.

Criminal justice is a worthy recipient of taxpayer funding because it is necessary for a democratic government. Modern democracy is based on equality between individuals. It would be inconsistent for a government to proclaim that each person is equal to another and that each (adult) deserves a vote, without having some sort of criminal justice system to proclaim that the equality it espouses also requires that it step in to punish those who act unequal by unjustifiably harming others. A government does not affirm equality simply by allowing everyone cast a vote. Since equality is an idea about the relations between individuals, the government must publicly disapprove of and prosecute all substantial infractions of equality. This is done by laws focusing on the declaration of superiority of some individuals over others and by the prosecution of the offenders.

If we are to embrace any real idea of property, we cannot fit social medical care into the lines of thought applied to war and criminal justice above. One might jump on the idea of equality and rights in an attempt to justify social medical care. However, this falls short due to the nature of equality. A ‘right to social medical care’ is not about equality. This in fact requires an instance of inequality. If the government pays for (taxpayers pay for) social medical care, this does have to do with the relation of individuals to each other, and it means that one is required to surrender his property for the good of another.

Additionally, it is quite the challenge to justify social medical care funded by the taxpayers based on equality, understood as saying something about the relation of individuals. This ‘right to social medical care’ is something that all people could possess or be granted, but so is a ‘non-right to social medical care’. One cannot justify ‘right to medical care’ based on equality simply because all can equally hold it. In the case where we have a sick person and a well person, these people have the same rights. The one who is well does not have a right to be well—he is just well. He is not being granted a privilege or right another is being rejected. He just has a different situation.

Simply letting each person appear at a balloting box and cast a vote is insufficient to recognizing equality. Without some sort of criminal justice system, a class of people would develop who would gain control through the voting apparatus by prohibiting those who would vote against them from voting.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Lex Talionis and Blame

Andrew Von Hirsch suggests that a main reason we punish is to show disapproval of a particular action. If this is an important part of the punishment, then it is important to blame in a proportional way across sentences. It would be wrong to blame someone who stole as much as someone else who murdered. Proportional sentencing does not prescribe a level of punishment, but it does say that greater punishment should be given for crimes of more blame.

The communication of this blame to the convicted and the public is important as well. It is not enough for the state to blame a convicted person if the offender or the public do not know that the convicted is blamed, or how much he is blamed. At the very least, the offender ought to have an idea of the blame the state is placing on him.

There is research suggesting widespread ignorance and an inaccurate sense of punishment levels for different crimes. It is then a reasonable guess that they will not understand a set of punishments non-equivalent mapping of crimes ranked according to blame levels—even if they are proportional. When the level of blame of a punishment can only be understood in the context of other punishments for other crimes, it is unlikely that an offender, or even the public, will grasp the level of blame his punishment is meant to convey.

There is a natural sort of relationship between a punishment and a level of blame. There is the equivalent relation between 1) harm caused and one’s culpability and 2) harm inflicted on the offender as punishment. Lots of pain equals lots of blame. In a scaled system of blame to pain, a little pain could equal significant blame, and this is something von Hirsch seems to favor. But it is reasonable to be concerned that the offender and others will be unaware of the blame conveyed, or what is actually only the blame meant to be conveyed. However, a punishment of ten lashes has a certain universal understanding. People know that is a really substantial penalty and represents a substantial amount of blame.